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В науковому повідомленні здійснений аналіз окремих передвиборчих програм політичних партій, які взяли участь у позачергових парламентських виборах 2014 р. Зокрема виділена та проаналізована зовнішньополітична тематика, дана оцінка євроінтеграційним гаслам основних політичних гравців.

Ключові слова: вибори, імітація активності, партія, політична система, фейк.

В научном сообщении осуществлен анализ отдельных предвыборных программ политических партий, принявших участие во внеочередных парламентских выборах 2014 частности выделена и проанализирована внешнеполитическая тематика, дана оценка евроинтеграционным лозунгам основных политических игроков.

Ключевые слова: выборы, имитация активности, партия, политическая система, фейк.

UDC 327
BBK 66.4

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THE PROBLEM OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION POSITIONS: VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE

The article deals with the problem of succession, successors and assesses succession under different political regimes. Special attention is given succession of presidential power in Venezuela. The work is also determined by the nature of continuity in the country and the role of voters in making or refusing candidates successor.

Keywords: successor, succession, president, Venezuela, the political elite, the Bolivarian Revolution.

Presidential republic - a state with the most consistent and yet rigid separation of powers, which involves formal isolation of each branch of government, the absence between them of close functional relationship. Given the fact that under this model the dominant position of elements in form of government holds the head of state - the president, the state in the form of his reign is traditionally called the presidential.

In all Latin American countries the President is head of state, he heads the government and the armed forces. Although these symptoms are common in presidential republics in terms of Latin America it creates a strong concentration of power in the hands of the president. Particularly important in this case, the leadership of the President of the armed forces, as the army often plays a decisive role in the political life of Latin American countries.

Thus, when a weak legislature and party structures in Latin America is no political force able to balance the influence of the president. President in these countries is not only the head of the executive branch, but also the center of political life, the head of the nation as a whole. Although by law the balance of power there is in practice dominated by the president and his powers far exceed the powers of other branches of government.

In such circumstances, there is danger of neglecting time frame the president in office. In recent decades, the heads of state of some Latin American countries are increasingly turning to this option changes the leader, as the transfer of power successor. Thus, the socialist revolution in Cuba leader Fidel Castro gave way to the head of the State Council brother R. Castro, and in December 2012 dying from cancer Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez publicly and officially named longtime ally, Vice President Nicolas Maduro as his successor. Therefore, the question of succession now is especially important for the countries of Latin America and other countries, faced with the problem of transfer of presidential power.

Institute of presidential power has attracted the attention of a number of researchers, including the need to highlight A.V. Gileva, P.V. Panova, K.A. Sulimova, D.A. Bodko, K.A. Nyeveryova, T.E. Vorozheykin, M. Shiftera, S. Combs and other. However, if a foreign science question succession of political power is reflected in a number of papers as these scientists and other researchers, in domestic it remains virtually unexplored, which necessitates studying the issue.

Applying the concepts of "successor" and "continuity" in the study of reproduction processes (changes) of power in modern societies recently become a major research challenge. Both words are included in the consumption of political practice and its wide (ie not highly professional) perception. Perhaps this is due to the fact that public attention was attracted by a peculiar phenomenon in the process of reproduction power, strictly speaking, is not new, but still probably not very significant, and therefore, conceptually designed. Today it has become important, and although it used the designation "old" words (previously "successor" meant literally "following the leader") in a new context, they have acquired a different meaning [6, p. 19-20].

Speaking of continuity in practice, it is important to note multiple meanings of the term "successor". In the most general sense is the successor of the individual occupying the position of its predecessor, whether the crown prince or president-elect. Despite the fact that the constitutions of different countries are usually clearly stated order of transfer of authority, often a process of "purpose" heir is in the context of informal democratic, but it indicates the balance of power and priorities of a group of elites.

As stress researchers PV Panov and KA Sulimov, "given the context in which the content was the formation of the concept -" successor "in modern discourse - both academic and political - can be a fairly high degree of confidence say that many modern countries (Belarus, Russia, Venezuela, Mexico, Cuba, etc.) "successor" - not just - "next." Moreover, under the successor often means not only succession policy. So, it is rather about understanding the phenomenon from the perspective of continuity of transfer of power "[7, p. 32]. It is from this perspective, this phenomenon is considered by many researchers in the analysis of the political process around the world. In this vein, we can speak of a common "backbone", which superimposed the features of the political culture of a country's political system and level of legitimacy among the power elites and the population.

No leader can not control power alone and therefore had to build a winning coalition, allocating resources among allies. Leaders and elites that form winning coalitions interested in meeting mutual obligations. But the prospect of a quick change of leader can lead to distrust of the agreement, the coalition pushing to treason and selecting "predatory" strategies in terms of shortened time horizon. The emergence of successor move allows time horizon and institutionalized succession, which became part of the political order, makes the horizon, so to speak, infinitely distant. The power of the leader provided support from a sufficient number of elite groups. This support can be seen as a game of coordination: to make a choice, each elite group must provide other choice. As a result, the condition for success is a common choice for a leader and an elite group that did not guess the choice of others, risks remain without winning [3, p. 101]. In such a game of coordination, participants need a "key" to align behavior researcher Thomas Shelling called the focal point. Focal point - a point where converging mutual expectations, or, according to the wording of the T. Shelling, expectations, "each about what others expect that he expects that they expect from him what he expects from them precisely such expectations about his actions" [9, p. 78]. Fokalnist means being in a state of first default. Thus, the current leader is ex officio the focus elites who seek winning coalition [3, p. 102].

In a situation where incumbent not able to claim the preservation office, he can symbolically convey his successor focal status. In other words, continuity as an institution is a unique way to preserve fokalnosti, despite the deaths of leaders, the possibility of losing their popularity, old age, sickness, constitutional constraints and other circumstances.

In his classic work "Exit, voice and loyalty" Albert Otto Hirschman writes: "From conversations with researchers of animal behavior ... I realized how smoothly and effectively resolved in baboons problem of leadership succession, creating many difficult problems in human society" [8, p. 14]. In these baboons leaders are gradually share their successors with powerful functions. In human societies, especially with weak institutions, such tactics gradual transfer of powers are rarely used, being the threat of conspiracies and disorientations of elites [4, p. 15], as to preserve a winning coalition of elites need a single focal point, not two parallel centers of power.

Closed authoritarian regimes must have institutionalized transfer of power. Traditional monarchy used for this purpose dynastic right, one-party autocracy - party institutions. Military regimes often do not have time to solve this problem, stuck in a vicious circle of coups, though sometimes they are well equipped institutes inherent to other modes, turning into a "hybrid" [12, p. 32]. In competitive autocracy [14, p. 36], as in democratic systems, the ruling groups have to legitimize the transfer of power in national elections. In competitive autocracy [14, p. 36], as in democratic systems, the ruling groups have to legitimize the transfer of power in national elections. This institute continuity can complement an institution of elections or even - in the case of weakness and ineffectiveness last - replace it [13, p. 19]. Textbook example of this substitution is the practice dedazo in Mexico, where for decades the voters only de facto presidential candidate claimed successor. But even in the formal question of passing new leader beyond the narrow circle of his decision requires politicians work to create a winning coalition that includes influential members of the elite and electoral brokers.

Today, the most visible examples of the successful application of succession is the practice of Venezuela, the political system is characterized by a strong presidential power. Therefore, we consider it appropriate to elaborate on the specifics of succession of the presidency of the State.

In December 8, 2012 Chavez, concerned about their own health, officially announced H. Maduro, who became at that time the vice-president, as his successor. Until then, the Chavez government passed himself twice in 1999 changed the constitution and the change in 2007, approved by a referendum, did allow him to be re-elected to the presidency an

unlimited number of times. Before coming to power Chavez of Venezuela was one of the most successful and stable democracies in Latin America, however, underlines the researcher Tatiana Vorozheykina, the local democracy was largely formal, despite the regular alternation in power of the two main parties. It reflects "interests of higher and middle classes, approximately 40% of the population who participated in the redistribution of oil revenues" [2, p. 90].

After the death of the president in March 2013, N. Maduro did not just put a candidate in the elections and became the acting president to bypass the Constitution of Venezuela. Indeed, according to article 233 of the Constitution of Venezuela [11], as Hugo Chavez, who won election as president January 10, 2013, did not have time to take the oath, the acting was to become parliament speaker (at the time - Diosdado Cabello). These events gave rise to much debate and opposition discontent. However, after clarification of the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court of Venezuela, according to which "in the case of President Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias no need for a new oath, since it is the president and re-elected in reality there was no interruption in the performance of duties" [5], controversial situation is resolved in favor of Nicolas Maduro. So we can see Chavez the authority that issued decisions on a successor, changed the laws of the country, the culture which has always been the tradition of legalism least significant.

Why Nicolás Maduro succeeded Hugo Chavez? First of all, H. Maduro was familiar with Chavez since the early 1990s - Cilia Flores, wife of N. Maduro, Chavez was a lawyer and his supporters to revolt in 1992 and contributed to their release from prison after the failure of the coup. Former president of this work, active participation in the Unified Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (next- PSUV)), and support for the course, held Chavez at a time when N. Maduro was a deputy of the National Assembly, and later foreign minister, made him one of the favorites Comandante (when the disease Chavez N. Maduro often stayed with him in Havana and spoke to Venezuelans to reports about the health of the national leader [17]).

This personal commitment as vice president of the Venezuelan leader and his policies and ideas is not questioned. Statements N. Maduro were filled with first rate importance, held Chavez government. Illustrative example is one of his speeches the vice-president in December 2012 during which the crowd began to chant his name, to which he replied triple "Chavez! Chavez! Chavez!" [16].

Later, during the election campaign N. Maduro widely used image of Chavez as a symbol: starting a campaign in Barinas, the hometown of Hugo Chavez, he actively has involved his image, audio and video recordings of his performances. The very image of the candidate Nicolosi Maduro was inspired by the late Commander follows: manner of speech and behavior, anti-imperialist, rhetoric against the US and even favorite Olimpiyki Chavez featuring the Venezuelan flag nadyahalys at a meeting with voters. Such open opposition imitation allowed H. Maduro called "shadow Chavez" because the candidate does not have the eccentricity of its predecessor, although it has established itself as a good diplomat and a faithful supporter of the ideas of the Bolivarian Revolution. [10] The researchers also who saw in N. Maduro's successor in 2012, expressed concern about how ordinary voters will react to his candidacy [15, p. 73]. But victory in the presidential election by a small margin, and later - and very high popular support, suggests the adoption of a new president.

Scientists DA Booths and KA Nevyerov note that the uniqueness of the Venezuelan case, change the head of state is that the candidacy successor chosen based on the following criteria: firstly, personal trust Chavez to his successor, the basis for which served as an old acquaintance and a common past, personal loyalty to the president and commitment to the basic ideological lines; Second, trust in people, which could earn N. Maduro as through personal data (native of the working class, his own work has reached a high position in the

state), and due to its position in government - as Foreign Minister N. Maduro did not could cause negative emotions in voters could do as energy minister and president of state oil company PDVSA, Rafael Ramirez, or governors William Lara and Adam Chavez, Diosdado Cabello and not enjoyed popularity among the common people. The image of the foreign minister is not associated in the minds of ordinary Venezuelans problems in social, economic and energy areas that directly affect the quality of life and satisfaction with him, while images of the governors and the Minister of Energy of the population can be identified failures in the aforementioned areas. N. Maduro not as a "puppet", chosen as a compromise, and that is easy to manipulate, but, above all, mature and experienced politician who held all the way from trade unions to the National Assembly and the government, and the faithful as "left" ideas as well as the head of state, which was in trusting relationships, which were the basis for the commitment to common views and common presence of the past with the beginning of his political career. In addition, the presence of Nicolas Maduro as president with a high degree of probability will lead to a rethinking of course Hugo Chavez, given the softer, subject to negotiation and compromise political style first, unlike the assertive, attacking style of the latter [1, p. 33].

So, summing up the practice of the existence of continuity in Venezuela can be concluded that the problem of succession as president in the country caused by the dominance of political trends personalism. Samuel continuity practices in the country can be described as "professionally-trust." The roots of the emergence lie in an effort to ruling elites (represented by Hugo Chavez and his supporters PSUV) to continue and at the same time slightly modernize the general course of the Bolivarian Revolution, founded in the late 1990s. And this course, according to the foregoing concept fokalnosti T. Schelling, yet is won.

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У статті розкривається проблема наступництва, дається оцінка наступникам та наступництву при різних політичних режимах. Особлива увага приділяється наступництву президентської влади в Венесуелі, визначається характер наступництва в даній країні та роль виборців при прийнятті чи відмові кандидатури наступника.

Ключові слова: наступник, наступництво, президент, Венесуела, політична еліта, Боліварська революція.

В статье раскрывается проблема преемничества, дается оценка преемникам и преемничеству в условиях различных политических режимов. Особое внимание уделяется преемственности президентской власти в Венесуэле, определяется характер преемственности в данной стране и роль избирателей при принятии или отказе от кандидатуры преемника.

Ключевые слова: преемник, преемничество, президент, Венесуэла, политическая элита, Боливарская революция.