
ЕТНОПОЛІТОЛОГІЯ ТА ЕТНОДЕРЖАВОЗНАВСТВО

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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF THE ETHNIC ACTORS
OF THE WEST-UKRAINIAN LANDS IN 1867–1914

The article examines the institutional processes in Austro-Hungary ethno-politics on the rights and needs of ethnic actors, processes, internal and external institutionalization Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, Romanian and German political actors Galicia and Bukovina. Characterized the legal basis for the formalization of political participation of citizens, policy priorities in terms of ethnic awakening. Traced the genesis of ethnic political mobilization of the catalyst, the ratio defined occupational structure and lines of social division in ethnic terms. Analysis platforms and strategies of political parties created along ethnic lines. Considered factors electoral mobilization and protest participation catalysts competition between ethnonational communities with equal status, variability protect group interests, compromises and consensus of formal and informal ethnic actors.

Keywords: institutionalization, ethnic actors, political mobilization, protection of group interests, ethnic conflict, interethnic compromis, interethnic interaction.

The constitutional reforms of the 1860-s that were carried out by the state created the normative and legal basis for the formalization of political participation. The state laid the foundation of the appropriate “institutional design”, reliable mechanisms of social interaction, favorable for constitutional rights and freedoms, ensuring participation of ethnicity bearers in the electoral process, namely, formation of the basis of electoral participation of voters as capable citizens of the state [5, p. 647]. Ethno-national policy of the state harmonizing relations between the state and ethnic minorities, ensuring their rights and implementing a certain ethno-political model was of paramount importance. Its components were legitimation of power, restriction of the amplitude of probable actions of ethnic minorities within formalized legal framework, neutralization of their ethnic separatism and possible claims for power in the country, harmonization of ethnic communities’ interaction and simultaneous formation of ethno-nations [1, p. 72]. However, the state used confrontational methods with regard to “foreigners”. First and foremost, the government practiced imposing and preserving vertical inter-ethnic relations, meeting the interests of the titular ethnic groups at the expense of “foreigners”. The latter, especially Jews who while being on “the way to equality”, had not been yet recognized as a separate ethnic community. That fact testified to a segregation model of ethnic policy applied to them. In the chronotope in question, state authorities pursued an aggressive/attacking policy with regard to group interests of Ukrainians and Jews.

The construction of vertical inter-ethnic relations was reduced to a common denominator positioning the state as an unconditional advocate of the titular / Polish ethno-nation, especially in Galicia. Under those conditions, the state faced a dilemma whether to create opportunities for ethnic minorities to foster their cultural resources, impose social and cultural values of nation-states upon those minorities; or to harmoniously combine those values with “theirs” applying certain policies and methods for this purpose, etc. Such a dilemma reflected orientation of political actors, on the one hand, on implementation of ethno-political model of the state (which was determined by the ruling dynasty and Government); and on the other hand, adherence to compliance of ethnic or political concept of the nation. The dilemma of nurturing / contrasting multiculturalism determined the task, topical to the Habsburg monarchy – pursuit for finding ways that would facilitate absorption in the bosom of ethno-psychological image of “us” of those who got associated with “them” through objective discreteness of ethnic thinking of the titular ethno-nations [10, p. 27-30].

Taking into consideration the fact that political and/or cultural symbols of ethnic communities are their languages, the steady expansion of the functioning of one of them (state)

while limiting the field of publicity of others in the chronotope under study – particularly Ukrainian and Jewish (Yiddish, Hebrew) – was a factor that strengthened the atmosphere of languages competition. Though local governments did not put forward the task of ethnic minorities' assimilation, they pursued discriminatory policies with regard to the language of ethnic majority and "local" languages, providing language preferences only to separate actors – core ethnos (Poles in Galicia and Germans – in Bukovina). Ethno-pluralistic policy of the government encouraged schooling of ethnic minorities. Models implemented by the state in the field of education reflected the strategy of the latter towards Jews and Germans [3, 200-214]. Vienna's ethnic policy in the church and religious segments determined, on the one hand, protection strategies and opportunities for minorities' religious institutions (with simultaneous preferences to dominant Catholic church); on the other hand, traditionalism of ethno-confessional communities and an important role of Christian churches and religious communities in maintaining selfhood/self-identification. The official Vienna maintained persistence in unifying church and religious space of the country. The government's attempts to keep under control certain religious communities and churches – the Jewish community in particular – were a vivid indicator of the government's attacking actions [7, p. 981].

Identity evolution – from religious to ethnic self-identification – resulted in genesis of the ethnic catalyst of political mobilization. Territorial identity was also an important feature of pre-nationalistic period. The territory served as the main gradient and was a factor of an individual's socialization and political mobilization. Collective ideas, group solidarity (as a system of myths and symbols) were not merely "attached" to a certain area; they were formed according to dominant social and political cultural norms. In the absence of its own statehood, in terms of sharing the joint area, Christian (Ukrainians, Poles, Armenians, Moldavians, Romanians) and non-Christian communities (Jews, Kraits) confessional/denominational factor intensified the feelings of ethnic identity of the population. Religious identity remained the demarcation line that divided the population of the region into "us" and "them", saturated interethnic socio-cultural space. Besides social class and territorial identity, confessional identity remained important; therefore, religion usually presupposed ethnicity [4, p. 161-180].

Absolutistic system of administration deprived ethnic groups of political subjectivity in advance, since, in ethnic terms, relations between an individual and the state were determined by religion (particularly in case of Jews). Ethnic and language differences acquired political significance in the mid-nineteenth century, when ethnic ideology began to emphasize the individual identity of ethnic nations, their cultures and languages. This emphasis was made on national values – ethnic interests, security, etc. Rapid spread of their elements was stimulated by literary works that played a significant role in shaping ethnic values. Ideas that became known through prose and poetry gained their opponents or followers within ethnic communities. This resulted in controversy escalation with regard to the formulation of national programs and national myths, particularly those concerning "Tirolians of the East", "Gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus" and the "sacred historical messengership of the gathering of "Russian" lands". Ethnic political mobilization catalyst was used by different political circles, on the one hand, to politicize ethnicity (it determined specificity of ethno-group dynamics); and on the other hand – to steer social protest in the direction of inter-ethnic strife [3, p. 296-299].

Differences between the utmost areal and dispersed nature of the residency of Ukrainians, Poles, Jews and other immigrant minorities, poor social **structuring of** ethnic groups affected the correlation of ethnic occupational structure and lines of social differentiation. A noteworthy feature of the occupational structure of the population was cultural division of labor that separated "us" and "them", as it predetermined the main criterion distinguishing certain communities from the public. A significant factor in the opposition "us – them" was the territory – environment for ethnic communities interaction and ground for desperate struggle for scarce resources, particularly land. The prerequisite for forming mutual, "monochromatic" images of communities that coexisted side by

side (for example, Ukrainians – farmers, Jews – merchants) was a conventional triad: residence, work activity, social “we”-experience. In this respect, economic interdependence of town and country was exceptional; however, it did not change the overall picture of differentiation lines. This was revealed through peasants’ sacralization of land and disregard for trade or even contempt to it. In the dichotomy of “us”/“them” religion played the most essential role, since it was a significant part of *ethnicity bearers*’ everyday life. The dichotomy of town and country was complicated by ethnic and religious confrontation. Due to its communicative function, language of everyday communication integrated introvert linguistic enclaves for its speakers setting them apart from speakers of other languages [2, p. 385-387].

In the linguistic environment, indifference of “others” enlarged rather than reduced ethno-psychological distance of interests between “us” and “them”, since impersonal social order prevented from the formation of zones of ethnic conflicts [2, p. 386]. The coincidence of interests of ethnic and social groups, often antagonistic to one another created prerequisites for the emergence and sustainability of myths, and auto- and hetero-stereotypes in the collective consciousness of each ethnic community in relation to one another. Social differentiation was preserved due to ethnic nationalisms that used ethnic history to develop images of “I” at different levels – (re) production of one’s own history, its appropriation by willful efforts, creation of “our” historical narration. The past wrong-doings catalyzed compensation-evaluation patterns. Ethno-social flavor saturated the definition of “otherness” and revealed itself in oppositions of Jews / Christians, urban / rural communities, the poor / the rich [4, p. 301-307; 3, p. 155-156].

Activities of ethnic parties that articulated ethno-groups’ interests and strategies for their protection reflected politicization of “we”-experiences. This was attached to non-conformism in protecting the rights of “us” generating prevalence of contradictions and conflicts in ethnic communities’ interaction. After all, policy *ethnization* and interethnic conflicts made ethnic parties – conflict groups – perform a functional role. Intermediary-representative functions were performed by party subjects of ethnic majority. On the one hand, they demonstrated priority of ethnic identity over its other types, manifested outside “we”-feeling that promoted institutionalization of ethnic socio-cultural distance; on the other hand, they materialized ethno-national interests, determined strategy and tactics to protect them. Despite the differences in attitudes to the nation-state and vision for the protection of cultural resources of ethnicity, all Ukrainian parties showed unanimity in statehood vision of the future of the Ukrainians [1, p. 75].

New deterministic impulses for the further *escalation* of the process of politicization of macro-social groups resulted in Ukrainian and Polish ethnic revivals and struggle between the two ethno-nations with regard to the problem of the scope of influence on political life in the region. In the chronotope under analysis, Ukrainians and Poles co-existed side by side in different socio-political conditions, but every time they felt distanced from each other, led an offensive policy to “foreigners”. Mutual confrontation and structuring of parties and organizations according to ethnic lines were considered axiomatic, and the structuring of the parties remained one of the decisive factors of ethno-political mobilization. Out-group broadcast of their platforms that implicitly reflected ideological constants of parties’ political players concerning ethnicity issues, “we”-feeling, as well as direct activities of Polish political parties in the Western Ukrainian lands tended to defend their own macro-social interests and transformed them into conflicting groups [8, p. 115].

Equally important was correlation of macro-social forces, formation of new competitive/conflicting sparring “partners” or adjustment of relations of old counterparts, especially in case of Jews. The latter, given their ethnic status and the struggle for civil equality, refused to be a “weapon” of the former in their pressure on the “neighbors”, put forward programs that regulated their interests. An integral component of ethno-political mobilization of Jews presupposed looking for their own national and cultural identity in the diaspora. Thus, the Zionist context became the main dominant of Jewish political life. Political figures of the Jewish community in the Western Ukrainian lands protected the interests of groups in different areas of public life and were not

opposed to groups' experiences of "*others*". The determining factors that intensified political party identification and structuring of the Jews were discrepancies in their assessment of the prospects of their ethnic group's residency [3, p. 209-210].

The German cultural and socio-political organizations were mostly inert as to political actors' institutionalization. Their environment was politically amorphous because, on the one hand, their institutions functioning in the Western Ukrainian lands at that time were culturally oriented; on the other hand, their work contributed to the preservation of ethnic identity of the Germans in the diaspora without opposing them to the nation-state. Representation of Romanian parties, as well as the German ones, was at a margin of the political figure topped by large landowners who articulated political ideas and ethnic myths. Their "aggressive stance" was directly related to ethnic revival, and, accordingly, to social recovery of local Ukrainians and Jews. As a result, the Romanian national organizations and party offices considered the growing inter-group competition as a threat to their interests [3, p. 214-215].

Variability of the protection of group rights by ethnic political actors proves that each of the ethno-nations was guided by goals that met their interests without taking into account aspirations of "*foreigners*". Therefore, according to the status of the subjects taking part in this protection, we classify political contradictions as clashes between unequal (Poles – Jews) and equal (Ukrainians – Jews) groups. All conflicts aiming at gaining power as the scarcest resource had the form of manifestations because of the utmost significance of the tasks that their direct participants – the state, on the one hand, and ethnic and political actors, on the other – tried to fulfill. Conflicts between ethno-nations were aggravated by political terror. Its subjects used ethnic terrorism that performed a defense function (similar to "guarding nationalism") of the national liberation struggle of the ethnic majority of the region and had a customized form.

The ethnic factor stipulated various ethno-social contradictions. They gave rise to conflicts that were steadily catalyzed by Ukrainian-Polish competition for land. The Polish colonization of Western Ukraine, including Eastern Galicia, set up the atmosphere of ethnic tension and competition that, in its turn, testified to extrapolating effects and practices of agricultural reforms in the political sphere. Symptoms of ethnic competition for land were seen not only among communities having equal and unequal statuses, especially between Ukrainians and Jews. Impoverishing of Ukrainians, combined with their awareness of the latent political purpose of the government, especially their attempts to artificially adjust ethno-demographic composition of the population, facilitated formation of a new platform mobilizing macro-social groups. This is proved by the fact that the cooperative movement of the ethnic majority of the region began to compete with "*foreigners*" – namely, Jews and Poles – who had been long dominating in trade and small-scale production. This, in turn, strengthened Ukrainian-Jewish competition which sharpened ethno-social contradictions between ethnicity bearers of both groups. Mutual intersection of ethnic and economic components served as a catalyst of ethno-social struggle for Western Ukrainian towns and cities. As competition for town gave the subjects of ethno-political processes an opportunity to solve their fundamental problems (to fill / strengthen social and cultural space of the cities; expand / retain their influence), their role and tasks in this struggle were predetermined by the status of their communities [4, p. 482-483].

In the economically poor region, the modernization module of the conflict was marked, first, by attempts of Jews and Poles to save economic preferences in urban areas and, secondly, by the efforts of local ethnic majority, aimed at changing their social structure and overcoming its poor structuring. Therefore, an opportunity to change the position of Ukrainians in the contemporary ethno-cultural division of labor urged Jews and Poles to defend their ethnic businesses.

Social and cultural disagreements in ethnic interaction – sometimes growing into conflicts – were caused by both objective and subjective factors. The former included the struggle for the national church under the conditions when ethnic and confessional values were tightly interwoven. The language catalyzing ethno-political mobilization of discriminated groups was another vital

element that galvanized the disputes concerning value differences between the subjects of interaction. Those tendencies found their vivid reflection in the struggle of ethnic minorities for native-*language* instruction at schools. The subjective factors included attempts of the government and Polish political actors to use religion as an additional means of ethnic assimilation of “foreigners” as well as to implement a Catholic version of ethno-nationalism [3, p. 306-307].

In our research, contradictions and conflicts that arose in the process of interaction of ethnic groups are defined as critical aggravation of disagreements in the shared reproduction of social reality by ethnic and religious communities. These differences were based on the violations of cultural values in the ethnic, religious or civilizational contexts which resulted in social status humiliation. In the chronotope under analysis, ethnicity served as a relatively independent conflict-provoking factor, and the growth ethno-national self-consciousness was one of the main causes of conflict in political, economic and cultural fields [4, p. 453-454].

Peculiarities of ethnic political actors’ participation in elections reflected the nature of interethnic relations and determined the character of after-election policy. Election campaigns, analyzed by us, as a rule, tended to polarize and radicalize different groups. This can be exemplified by “Galician elections” did not contribute to stability and *representativeness* of electoral processes. They were also characterized by various signs of so-called election demonstrations – promises to electors, which showed that ethnic leaders were not ready for the realities of post-election political processes. Under the election system of that time, particularly under unstable unrepresentative political process, institutional instability of both the Reichsrat and regional Sejms was combined with attempts of dominant ethnic groups to gain control over institutions without allowing the members of other ethnic communities to share scarce resources (especially power) and solve important social issues [6, p. 177, 185]. As public administration in Galicia, represented by Polish political actors and ethnic elites, abused the established system of election, electoral participation of Ukrainians and Jews was accompanied by a large chain of post election demarche actions – the signing of petitions, organization of meeting, rallies and manifestations.

The introduction of universal suffrage did not change the situation radically, since the preservation of political influence of Poles in Galicia was provided by the special election geometry – a formation of artificially unequal two-mandate electoral districts/constituencies. In this respect, we can claim that the government used the method of “*Jerrymandering*” – a strategy of “selective geography”, which was characterized by redistricting scheme favoring the “majority of minority” [3, p. 393]. In their turn, the subjects of the election campaign, and thus the new election system, proved the existence of stable, but unrepresentative political process.

According to it, one or more weak ethnic groups were subject to the dominant group or the coalition of stronger groups. Therefore, stability was achieved due to domination, and that is why any political process can be called democratic only with regard to dominant groups. The effectiveness of government control as a catalyst of ethnic contradictions can be traced not only in the interaction Ukrainians and Poles, but also that of Poles and Jews. It was proved by their response to the new format of Ukrainian-Jewish relations during the adoption of the new election law and the election campaign to the Reichsrat. Undoubtedly, ethnic political actors influenced the nature and content of these relations. This is convincingly proved by empiricism of the situation under analysis – the participants of the Ukrainian-Jewish alliance had a conscious or subconscious perception of some connection between the level of ethnic tension, on the one hand, and the power of the local Polish administration in Galicia, on the other [9, p. 381-383].

We distinguish several distinctive characteristics in the activities of ethnic political actors: protection of languages, demands to introduce autonomy in its territorial and extraterritorial versions, electoral reforms, favorable conditions for preserving ethnic cultural resources, protection of other groups’ interests. Numerous party institutions or other political figures articulated ethno-nationalism and presented ethnic group interests of ethno-political subjects. On the one hand, objectives for ethnic consolidation, aggregated by ethnic political actors and ethnic leaders,

predetermined behavioral patterns of ethnic groups aiming at obtaining all civic and ethnic rights; on the other hand, the offensive strategy of the central government aimed at integrating subordinate groups into the imperial organism served as a catalyst shaping political behavior patterns of ethnic groups.

Political activities of subordinated groups implied the presence of two main platforms that could help to achieve a compromise – cooperation in building the state and opposition to it. The latter proved to be unacceptable for all ethnic communities – especially for Jews and Germans – in Western Ukrainian lands. In order to obtain parity of rights with the nation-state, all ethnic minorities – without any exception – strove to create favorable conditions for preserving their own cultural resources. That specified the key criterion of their vision of possible compromise between ethnic communities with different statuses – integration into one state as equal subjects of the political nation. Yet, absence of common large-scale campaigns, run by ethnic minorities, aimed at their integration into ethno-political organism of the Habsburg monarchy as equal subjects, lack of mutual support in this process proved that their cooperation was occasional and did not outline dominant trends in bi- or multilateral interactions [1, p. 73].

Interaction of ethno-national communities with the same statuses was modified by interest discrepancies of Ukrainians and immigrant minorities, as well as their mutual response to the attempts of one of the subjects of inter-ethnic cooperation to achieve the goals that contradicted the interests of other subordinated groups, as well as readiness/non-readiness of the latter or their representatives to protect “*their*” interests. Political positioning of dispersed communities was of particular significance, as it indicated response patterns of autochthonous ethnic majority in Western Ukraine. The preconditions for the settlement of ethnic contradictions were awareness of the causes of conflict-provoking relationships with “*foreigners*”, the degree of readiness (for concessions to “*foreigners*” and protection of “*their*” interests”), as well as their refusal to support a third party hostile to the selected partner [2, p. 380].

It specified the key criterion in their vision of interethnic compromise of ethno-national communities with different statuses: integration into “*our*” / “*their*” state as equal ethnic subjects of the political nation. The status-role factor of initiatives was manifested due to diversification of compromise “design” between the status differences of “*foreigners*”. They were achieved by ethnic political actors by means of focusing on proposals regarding changes in the status quo, addressed to the nation-state. One of the planes that facilitated shaping / manifesting compromise between ethno-national communities with different statuses was the part they played in protecting the state against external enemies, or, given the nature of international relations at a particular point in history, proofs of readiness to effectively defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Undoubtedly, political loyalty had also laid the groundwork for the compromise of ethnic minorities with a third party participation – political actors from among the titular ethnic group or country. Initiatives to settle ethnic conflicts were formed as a common denominator of two factors: probable correction of relations with third powers – the result of peculiar relations of a possible ally with other ethnic minorities and the state; the depth of bilateral disagreements of the partners, their desire to neutralize social or other contradictions, or vice versa – to acquire positive experience (at least, in terms of emotionless coexistence).

In the studied chronotope, the prospect of harmonious interaction of ethnic communities–holders of equal statuses depended on two factors: mutual readiness of groups or their representatives to cooperate in order to implement essential tasks; out-group expression of empathy [3, p. 395].

Compromises and consensuses of formal and inform ethnic political actors had their own peculiarities. In “*Bukovinian*” plot of ethno-political subjects’ activities in Western Ukraine, we distinguish a special type of tactics of ethnic political actors who had achieved a compromise. In this case, the regulatory function of communities’ inter-ethnic interaction was verified by evolving one ethno-political situation into others – compromise and cooperation. Preconditions for constructive

cooperation of ethnic minorities were created due to internal bifurcation of Bukovinian ethnic groups and increase of the number of ethnicity bearers that represented nonconformist-protective ethno-political behavioral pattern, emergence of their political actors in regional Sejms who tried to achieve consensus with the central and regional government. Features of “Bukovinian consent” give grounds to speak about the presence in the political space of the region of the “Bukovina paradox” – ethno-political situation in which certain political actors (mainly disadvantaged by government/nation-state) of ethnic minorities expressed their protest distancing themselves decisively from making decisions concerning public development of the region. It resulted in stalemate situations of choice/absence of choice for ethnic minorities when both nation-state and the ethnic majority of the area of study sought their loyalty. This testified to the fact that, unlike inert potential allies, true partners formed within the bodies of representative power could be found among political actors who held the same status though belonged to “foreigners”.

Thus, the *Bukovinian compromise* of 1910 can be viewed as an example of political actors’ competition for either elected or appointed positions and, therefore, the need to achieve understanding among candidates representing different ethnic groups. In the context of “the Bukovinian consent”, integrative behavioral patterns of political actors representing Ukrainians, Romanians, Poles, Germans and Jews were quite noticeable. This compromise allowed introducing general, direct and secret ballot based on the principle of national curiae, according to which seats were distributed among Bukovinian ethno-nations in proportion to their population in every curia. Adoption of a new electoral law by the Chernivtsi City Council in 1912 resulting from the “Bukovinian consent” promoted democracy installing Ukrainian, Romanian, German, and Polish national cadaster/inventories [4, p. 537-539].

The “status-role” factor allowed variability of conditions affording to achieve inter-ethnic compromise between Ukrainians and Poles in Galicia. Besides, initiatives of their political actors corresponded to integrative behavior of ethno-political groups they represented. The mutual agreement on rules and procedures of the *Galician compromise* of 1914 was the weakest point of the compromise, whereas the agreement concerning ideological adjustments and values of the dominant elites and the opposition was considered as the most stable point. Hence, taking into account the criterion of stability (“D. Nash balance”) and optimality (“V. Pareto balance”), we can claim that the pre-compromise stage was stable enough, though hardly optimal.

Therewith, their inability to overcome the legacy of the past and the elements of crisis in bilateral relations, acquired during interactions at a specific historical stage, to balance “we” – and “they”-interests were proved by the struggle between the conservative Polish minority and the Polish-Ukrainian democratic majority in the Sejm, the Polish position of bishops in Galicia, as well as statements of Ukrainian and Polish factions in the Sejm and the Reichsrat. We believe that they resulted from lack of consistent commitment of the nation-state and government to finding out reasons for interethnic crisis, including claims of Ukrainians and Poles. These circumstances were supplemented with external factors – the Balkan conflict and the risk of future Austrian-Russian war that created a new political situation in Polish-Ukrainian relations [4, p. 546, 547].

The implementation of the Sejm agreement of 1914 showed that absence of tangible changes in the Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia as well as generally dominant antagonism in the relationship of the two ethno-nations testified to the fact that the refusal of the state to meet fair requirements of the ethnic majority of the region crossed out the prospect of achieving consensus and compromise between ethno-nations even in the nearest future. In contrast to harmonization of relations that couldn’t be achieved due to interaction of ethnic minorities and which represented horizontal configuration of compromise, cooperation with the titular ethnic group initiated by ethnic minorities had a vertical direction of fit. Therefore, we classify the compromise of 1914 as artificial, because both Polish and Ukrainian political actors failed to agree without intervention of a third force on which they depended [3, p. 292].

The impact of informal ethnic political actors on the adjustment of group attitudes towards “foreigners” was stipulated by the following factors: membership of intelligentsia in associated groups; active participation in political parties; direct engagement in the process of outlining/shaping ethnic interests; activities of prestigious professional associations; periodicals broadcasting of judgments that significantly influenced the tone of “we”-feeling, their nomination. Intellectuals performed the role of a significant promoter of political culture in the bosom of ethno-nations to which they belonged; therefore, defending their group interests became a determinative trend of their positioning in corresponding ethnic and political processes. Students of regional universities were creators / propagators of certain types of political culture while priests were “educators” of tolerance and direct/indirect creators of sentiment towards “foreigners”.

In the chronotope under analysis, orientations with regard to “others” was developed in three interrelated areas: political identification; “political faith” (ethnicity bearers’ belief that other actors of political life meant good / bad for them, willingness to cooperate with representatives of “other” ethnic groups or to oppose them); orientations concerning “rules” (which value-normative adjustment should be used in the interaction of ethnic and political actors) [4, p. 625-626; 3, p. 308-311]. Unlike formal ethnic political actors, informal ethnic political actors produced their own new mechanisms of self-regulation and values determining the necessary criteria for their activities that went beyond their ethno-social and ethno-political requirements. Besides, informal ethnic political actors had to oppose the established conflict “tradition” of ethnic interaction and stereotypes of competitive political thinking in the bosom of their ethno-nations. However, practical activities of intellectuals and their judgments broadcast outside their strata testified to quite different conclusions: their majority failed to generate new ideas and rise to a new level of inter-cultural interaction, and the scale of the architecture of their political culture that had been proposed by informal ethnic political actors consisted primarily in symbolism. Hence, we can state that their activities were relevant to activist political culture, because active participation of informal ethnic political actors in society had laid preconditions for influencing decision-making with the direct participation of ethnic formal political actors.

У статті досліджуються інституційні процеси у сфері етнополітики Австро-Угорщини щодо забезпечення прав та потреб етнічних акторів, процесів зовнішньої та внутрішньої інституціоналізації українських, польських, єврейських, румунських і німецьких політичних акторів Галичини і Буковини. Охарактеризовано нормативно-правову основу формалізації політичної участі громадян, пріоритети політики держави в умовах етнічного пробудження. Простежено тенецу етнічного каталізатора політичної мобілізації, визначено співвідношення професійної структури та ліній соціального розмежування в етнічному вимірі. Проаналізовано платформи та стратегії діяльності політичних партій, створених за етнічним принципом. Розглянуті мобілізаційні фактори електоральної та протестної участі, каталізатори конкуренції між різностатусними етнонаціональними спільнотами, варіативність захисту групових інтересів, компроміси та консенсуси формалізованих та неформалізованих етнічних акторів.

Ключові слова: інституціоналізація, етнічні актори, політична участь, політична мобілізація, захист групових інтересів, міжетнічний конфлікт, міжетнічний компроміс, міжетнічна взаємодія.

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