THE PHENOMENON OF THE “CAPTURE STATE”: ITS ESSENCE AND CONSEQUENCES FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Abstract

The article analyzes the phenomenon of a “captured state” in the Ukrainian political context. The author examines the main characteristics, mechanisms, and consequences of the functioning of a clan-oligarchic political regime, which is characterized by the dominance of private interests over public ones. The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the state, enshrines the basic principles – the social contract, while procedural norms ensure the enforcement of constitutional provisions. This creates a corresponding legal framework that shapes certain political (socio-economic, etc.) practices, which in turn form a specific “path”, or trajectory, for the country’s development. However, the logic of introducing democratic political institutions and the democratic transition in Ukraine has led to opposite results. Instead of a full-fledged democracy, the country has developed a political regime that is commonly referred to as a clan-oligarchic system, with the state essentially becoming a “captured state” by these financial-industrial groups (FIGs). The article reveals how oligarchic groups of influence use state institutions to gain personal benefits and control over the state and explores possible ways to dismantle this regime. It highlights the conceptual foundations of a “captured state” and provides a critical analysis of the political, economic, and social consequences for Ukraine. The study offers significant scientific and practical potential for understanding and further reforming political processes in post-Soviet countries.